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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature ofthe Case, Statement of Facts, And Course of Proceedings
Mr. Dunlap's direct appeals involve challenges to his death sentence and the procedures
used to impose it, not guilt-phase claims or errors. In 1977, the Idaho legislature made a policy
decision to broadly define the scope of this Court's independent review of death sentences and
the procedures used to impose them. See I.C. § 19-2827.
This decision was based upon the legislature's commitment to ensurmg Idaho was
implementing a constitutional death penalty scheme. For more than thirty years, this Court has
honored the legislature's decision and the mandates of the statute. Based upon an opinion in
which this Court addressed unobjected-to guilt-phase errors in a non-death penalty case, the State
now asserts this Court has rejected the legislature's policy decision broadly defining the scope of
independent review of death sentences and procedures. Because the State has failed to show how
this Court's adherence to the mandates of section 19-2827 has been unwise or proven
unworkable, the State's claim fails.
ISSUE
Whether Mr. Dunlap's Sentencing Proceeding and Death Sentence Are Subject To
Mandatory Review Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-2827, As Informed by Over Thirty Years
of Precedent, Or Fundamental Error Review As Defined In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010).
ARGUMENT
The enactment of Idaho Code section 19-2827 was part of the legislature's attempt to
meet constitutionally-required standards for the imposition of the death penalty. Section 19-2827
requires this Court to independently review death sentences and the means by which such
sentences are imposed, to ensure the death penalty in Idaho is administered and applied in a

consistent and principled manner, and that it is both humane and sensible to the uniqueness of
the individual.
A.

This Court's Independent Review Of Death Sentences And Sentencing Proceedings
Under Section 19-2827 Is Constitutionally Required

Idaho's mandatory appellate review statute was enacted

III

response to Furman v.

Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (concluding on facts of cases before it that death

penalty was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments), and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976); Appellant's Reply Br., pp.46. In Gregg, the Court was asked to address the constitutionality of Georgia's recently modified
death penalty scheme just a few years after the Court declared Georgia's prior scheme
unconstitutional. 428 U.S. at 179-80. Under the new scheme, Georgia limited the number of
death eligible offenses, identified clear and objective aggravating circumstances, one of which
had to be found before a jury could impose death, and required consideration of mitigating
circumstances in the sentencing decision. Jd. at 196-98. With these changes, the Court concluded
Georgia's death penalty scheme sufficiently limited the jury's discretion and minimized the risk
of the arbitrary and capricious imposition of death, rendering it constitutional. Jd. at 196-98.
In upholding Georgia's scheme, the Court emphasized the importance of the Georgia
Supreme Court's mandatory review all death sentences to determine: (1) if the sentence was
imposed under the influence of passion or prejudice; (2) if the evidence supported the jury's
finding of aggravating circumstances; and (3) if the sentence was disproportionate compared to
other sentences imposed in similar cases. Jd. at 198 (citing Ga. Stat. § 27-2537(c) (Supp. 1975)).
The provision for appellate review in the Georgia capital-sentencing system
serves as a check against the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.
In particular, the proportionality review substantially eliminates the possibility
that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant jury. If a time
comes when juries generally do not impose the death sentence in a certain kind of
2

murder case, the appellate review procedures assure that no defendant convicted
under such circumstances will suffer a sentence of death.
Jd at 206. The Gregg decision prompted state legislatures, including Idaho's, to adopt similar

appellate review statutes to bring their respective death penalty schemes into constitutional
compliance. l See State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 409 (1981) (noting the legislature added
Section 19-2827 to meet the Supreme Court's objections to Idaho's death penalty statute).
Specifically, in order to satisfy Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment principles and
minimize the risk of the arbitrary and capricious imposition of death sentences, the Supreme
Court has required death penalty schemes to channel and limit a sentencer's discretion through
clear and objective standards which "make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a
sentence of death," emphasizing the need for meaningful appellate review. Arave v. Creech, 507
U.S. 463, 470 (1993) (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774

1 All states that have retained the death penalty have some form of automatic or mandatory
appellate review of death sentences. Ala. Code § 13A-5-53; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-756, 703.04(A); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-603(d); Cal. Penal Code §§ 190.4 and 1239; Colo. Rev. Stat. §
18-1.3-120l; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209; Fl. R. App. Proc. R. 9.142, Fl. Stat. § 921.141(4)
and Sinclair v. State, 657 So.2d 1138 (Fla.1995); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-35; Ind. Code. § 3550-2-9; Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-4627, - 6619; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.075; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
905.9 and La. S. Ct. Rule 28, Capital Sentence Review, Rule 905.9.1; Md. Code Ann., Crim.
Law §2-401 and Md. Rule 8-306; Miss. Code Ann. § 99-99-105; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 565.035;
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-308 and Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-310; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2521.01,
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2521.03, and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2525; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 177.055; N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630:5; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.05; Okla.
Stat. tit. 21, § 701.13; Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 138.012 and State v. Moore, 324 Or. 396 (Or. 1996);
42 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 9711; S.c. Code Ann. § 16-3-25; S.D. Codified Laws §23A-27A-9 and S.D.
Codified Laws § 23A-27 A-12; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
37.071 (2)(h); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 and State v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342 (Utah 2001): Va.
Code. Ann. § 17.1-313; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 10.95.100, 10.95.130; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2103.

When the Supreme Court issued its decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 US. 584, 608 n.6 (2002), 29
of the 38 states with the death penalty already committed sentencing decisions to juries. Thus,
where mandatory appellate review existed simultaneously with jury sentencing for decades in
other jurisdictions, it cannot be said the shift in Idaho to jury sentencing has changed this Court's
mandatory review obligation.
3

(1990) (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (plurality opinion))); Parker v.
Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1991) (,The Constitution prohibits the arbitrary or irrational

imposition of the death penalty. We have emphasized repeatedly the crucial role of meaningful
appellate review in ensuring that the death penalty is not imposed arbitrarily or irrationally.");
Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 749 (1990) ("Furthermore, this Court has repeatedly

emphasized that meaningful appellate review of death sentences promotes reliability and
consistency."); accord Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37,45-51 (1984); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S.
862, 890 (1983); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282,295-96 (1977).
Appellate review of death sentences has thus become part of our nation's death penalty
jurisprudence by constitutional necessity. State legislatures seeking to protect death penalty
schemes against constitutional challenge enacted appellate review provisions, which offered a
measure of assurance that even if a wayward sentencer were to improperly impose death upon an
undeserving defendant, the error would be remedied by an appellate court responsible for
ensuring death is imposed in a way that is "consistent and principled but also humane and
sensible to the uniqueness of the individuaL" Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12
(1982).
B.

This Court Has Consistently Applied Section 19-2827 To Independently Review
Death Sentences And Related Sentencing Proceedings
Mr. Dunlap's appeals involve challenges to his death sentence and the manner in which it

was imposed, both of which are within the scope of this Court's appellate review obligation as
set forth in section 19-2827. This Court first applied section 19-2827 in Osborn, 102 Idaho at
410, when it was asked to consider the defendant's argument that the district court erred in
relying on a preliminary hearing transcript in lieu of live witness testimony at his sentencing.
Where the defendant "did not object to the use of the preliminary hearing record at the time, and
4

III

fact acquiesced in its use," this Court considered as a threshold matter whether it could

address the issue at alL Jd. Concluding it could, this Court held:

This general rule applicable to appellate review of error is not necessarily
controlling where we are statutorily required to undertake appellate review
irrespective of the defendant's contentions, if any. Death is clearly a different kind
of punishment from any other that may be imposed, and I.C. § 19-2827 mandates
that we examine not only the sentence but the procedure followed in imposing that
sentence regardless of whether an appeal is even taken. This indicates to us that we
may not ignore unchallenged errors. Moreover, the gravity of a sentence of death
and the infrequency with which it is imposed outweighs any rationale that might
be proposed to justifY refusal to consider errors not objected to below.
Id. at 41 0-11 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). A few years later, this Court commented on

section 19-2827 and similar mandatory review statutes:

It has also been noted that, where a uniform process of appellate review is built in
by way of a statutory requirement, there is an increased likelihood of consistent,
well-guided application of such statutory aggravating circumstances. Such a
system "can assure consistency, fairness and rationality in the evenhanded
operation of the state law ... [T]his [type of! system serves to assure that sentences
of death will not be 'wantonly' or 'freakishly' imposed." Profitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242, 259-260, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2969-2970, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (opinion of
Powell, 1., in which Stewart and Stevens, JJ., joined). Here our legislature has
required that every capital sentencing decision be reviewed by this Court and has,
in! C. § J9-2827, further enhanced uniform application by requiring comparison
of capital cases.

State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 371 (1983) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Thus, this
Court has always accepted the legislature'S ability to define the scope of this Court's
independent review of death sentences and sentencing proceedings, and has consistently applied
section 19-2827 to review capital sentencing errors not raised on appeal or objected to below.
This Court has consistently applied section 19-2827 to review death sentences and
unobjected-to capital sentencing errors, while still applying fundamental error review to
unobjected-to guilt-phase errors. All capital cases where this Court applied section 19-2827
and/or fundamental error review to address errors that were not objected to below are identified
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here by the issue addressed, whether it was raised on appeal, and how it was reviewed by this
Court. For ease of reference, cases are listed in reverse chronological order in table format.

---"-~-G~i~t J>hase~::~::~~::-~.-t-__R_~_l_i_se_d_o_n_A. _lr_:_V.e_i~_l~_;_M__~.lIl n_e_I_'_..(
State v.Ya~e~l Sentencing: Whether sections 19- Raised on appeal;
reviewed
__..

Idaho 548,
(2008)

State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 6364 (2003)

State v. Hairston,
133 Idaho 496,
507-08 (1999)
State v. Wood, 132
Idaho 88, 94-95
(1998)
State v. Porter,
130 Idaho 772,
785-86 (1997)

)f_'--I

and 18-215 of Idaho Code pursuant to section 19-2827
precluded admission at sentencing
of defendant's statements to state
experts during mental health
examinations
Sentencing: Whether admission of
inflammatory
vIctIm
impact
statements violated defendant's
constitutional rights
Guilt-Phase: Whether defendant's
due process rights were violated by
magistrate's failure to suspend
proceedings pending a competency
inquiry before moving forward with
the preliminary hearing
Guilt-Phase:
Prosecutorial
misconduct m guilt-phase closing
argument
Sentencing: Whether sentencing
judge should have recused himself
from presiding over defendant's
case
Guilt-Phase: Whether the trial court
erred in permitting the State to call
the defendant's investigator as a
witness in its case-in-chief, for the
purpose
of
impeaching
the
investigator

Raised on appeal; basis for review
not clear

Raised on appeal; reviewed for
fundamental error

Raised on appeal; not reviewed
because it was not fundamental
error
Raised on appeal with supporting
argument
but
no
authority;
reviewed pursuant to section 192827
Raised on appeal; reviewed for
fundamental error

Guilt-phase: Whether prosecutorial
misconduct m failing to timely
disclose expert report & improper
comments
during
witness
questioning and closing argument
entitled the defendant to a new trial

Raised on appeal; reviewed for
fundamental error

Guilt-Phase: Whether the district
court erred in failing to sua sponte

Raised on appeal; no error because
neither party requested instruction

6

Case

Guilt Phase or SellJ~llcing Issue
instruct the jury on a lesser included
offense
.~~.~-~-

-r--~-'-'--~----------'~'----~-----l

Guilt Phase: Whether the definition
of torture murder under Idaho Code
section 18-4003, of which the
defendant was convicted, was
vague, overbroad and ambiguous as
applied
State v. Fields) 127 Guilt-phase:
Whether
the
Idaho 901, 910-11 eyewitness identifications of the
defendant were tainted by media
(1995)
publication of his photograph
reVIew of death
State v. Wells) 124 Sentencing:
Idaho 836 (1993)
sentence and sentencing procedures

State v. Rhoades)
120 Idaho 795
(1991 )

State v. Fain) 119
Idaho 670, 672-73
(1991 )

State v. Pizzuto,
119 Idaho 742,
752-54,
760-64
(1991)

Raised on Appeal; Manner of
Review

Sentencing: Whether admission and
consideration of improper victim
impact
statements
created
unconstitutionally improper risk of
the death penalty being imposed in
an arbitrary and capricious manner
Sentencing: Whether admission and
consideration of improper victim
impact
statements
created
constitutionally unacceptable risk of
death penalty being imposed in an
arbitrary and capricious manner
Guilt-phase: Whether prosecutor's
injection of his personal beliefs or
opinions into guilt-phase closing
argument constituted fundamental
error

Raised on appeal with no argument
or authority; request for leave to
address the issue at oral argument.
Not reviewed due to lack of any
support, argument or authority
Raised on appeal; reviewed for
fundamental error

Defendant dismissed appeal and
withdrew post-conviction petition,
thus raising no issues on appeal.
Section 19-2827 review
Unknown; reviewed for harmless
error but basis for review not stated

Unknown; reviewed for harmless
error but basis for review not stated

Raised on appeal; reviewed for
fundamental error

Sentencing: Whether admission and Raised on appeal; reviewed
consideration of Improper victim pursuant to Section 19-2827
impact statements violated the
defendant's constitutional rights
State v.
Bryan Guilt-phase: Whether defendant Raised on appeal; not reviewed
113 was denied his constitutional right to because it was not fundamental
Lankford,
Idaho 688, 693-95 trial before fair and impartial jury by error
trial court's failure to question jurors
(1987)
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Case

Guilt Phase or Sentencing Issue
about pretrial publicity

Raised on Appeal; Manner of
Review

Guilt-phase: Whether it violated Raised on appeal; not reviewed
defendant's due process rights for because it was not fundamental
trial court to let uniformed sheriffs error
deputies sit in courtroom with him
Guilt-phase:
Whether
Jury
instructions as a whole misstated
law and so misled and confused jury
as to deny defendant a fair trial
State v. Scroggins, Guilt-Phase: Whether the failure to
110 Idaho 380, instruct Jury about need for
385-86 (1985)
of
accomplice
corroboration
testimony entitled defendant to an
acquittal or new trial
State v. Sivak, 105 Sentencing: Whether jury could be
Idaho 900, 903 excluded from sentencing without
(1983)
violating Constitution
State v. Creech, Sentencing: Whether resentencing
105 Idaho 362, the defendant to death violated the
prohibition against double jeopardy
375 (1983)

State v. Osborn,
102 Idaho 405,
410-16 (1981)

Sentencing: Whether resentencing
the defendant to death violated ex
post facto application of the law
Sentencing: Whether sentencing
court erred in relying on transcript
of preliminary hearing rather than
live testimony in open court
Sentencing: Whether defendant was
denied due process by state's failure
to notifY him formally that it was
seeking death or forewarn him
which aggravating circumstances it
would seek to prove at sentencing

Raised on appeal; reviewed for
fundamental error

Defendant
moved
for
new
trial/acquittal on this ground below;
reviewed for fundamental error

Not raised by parties; raised and
reviewed by Court under 19-2827
Not raised by parties; raised and
reviewed by Court under 19-2827

Not raised by parties; raised and
reviewed by Court under 19-2827
Raised on appeal; reviewed by
Court under 19-2827

Raised on appeal; reviewed by
Court under 19-2827

Sentencing: Whether the trial court Unknown if raised on appeal;
erred III failing to identify the reviewed by Court under 19-2827
mitigating factors it considered in its
sentencing decision
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As these cases demonstrate, this Court has consistently applied section 19-2827 to review death
sentences and unobjected-to capital sentencing errors.
By its briefing, the State implies this Court has refused to address capital sentencing
errors if such errors were not identified, briefed and supported by argument and citation to legal
authority on appeal. (See Supp. Br. of Resp., pp.l 0-11 ("This Court has also recognized that even
sentencing claims can be waived if the defendant fails to comply with LA.R.35(a)(6).").) This
claim fails to recognize and distinguish among the three reviews being conducted at the same
time by this Court in a unified appeal: direct appeal, post-conviction appeal, and section 19-2827
independent review. See

I.e.

§ 19-2827(f) ("The sentence review shall be in addition to direct

appeal, if taken, and the review and appeal shall be consolidated for consideration.");

I.e. § 19-

2719(6) ("In the event the defendant desires to appeal from any post-conviction order entered
pursuant to this section, his appeal must be part of any appeal taken from the conviction or
sentence. All issues relating to conviction, sentence and post-conviction challenge shall be
considered in the same appellate proceeding."). While it is true this Court does not review postconviction errors that are not identified, briefed and supported by argument and citation to legal

authority on appeal, it does not treat sentencing errors the same way. The State cites Creech, 132
Idaho at 1, and Porter, 130 Idaho at 795, for support; however, neither case addresses the scope
of this Court's independent review in capital cases.

In Creech, this Court did not decline to address sentencing errors on independent review,
but instead refused to address Creech's post-conviction claims alleging his trial counsel was
ineffective because the claims were not preserved or they lacked merit. Creech, 132 Idaho at 1921 (rejecting Creech's claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: challenge his prior
conviction; preserve meritorious appellate issues; withdraw after Creech pled guilty; file a proper
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motion to withdraw his guilty plea; protect Creech's communications with mental health
professionals; and spend sufficient time with him). Similarly, in Porter, this Court did not refuse
to address sentencing errors on independent review; rather, this Court refused to address the
defendant's guilt-phase claim that the statute defining first-degree murder by torture was
unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and ambiguous as applied to him. 2 Porter, 130 Idaho at
794-95.
Thus, this Court has always applied section 19-2827 and has consistently addressed
unobjected-to capital sentencing errors through its independent review obligation, irrespective of
whether such errors were identified and supported by argument and legal authority on appeal.
C.

The State's Request For This Court To Apply Fundamental Error Review
Standards To Capital Sentencings Disregards The Unique Nature Of The Death
Penalty, The Plain Language Of Section 19-2827 And Principles Of Stare Decisis

The State's invitation for this Court to review capital sentencing errors for fundamental
error under the standard announced in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 219 (2010), disregards the
unique nature of the death penalty, the plain language of section 19-2827, and principles of stare
decisis, and must be rejected.
In Perry, this Court clarified the standard appellate courts would apply to reVIew
unobjected-to guilt-phase trial errors. 150 Idaho at 228. Under the standard announced in Perry,
the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that an alleged error:
(1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2)

plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was
a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.

Notably, Porter did not object to the statute below and did not present argument or authority in
support of his challenge on appeal; he "simply requested leave to address the issue in oral
argument." Porter, 130 Idaho at 795.
2
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Id at 228. In contrast, when a trial error is objected to below and the defendant establishes the
error occurred, the burden shifts to the State to prove to the appellate court, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the error did not contribute to the jury's verdict. Id at 222, 227-28. This latter
standard is often called harmless error review and it is the standard this Court has historically
applied to capital sentencing errors. Were this Court to apply Perry's fundamental error standard
to review death sentences and capital sentencing errors, not only would it shift the burden of
proof from the State to the defendant, it would also prevent this Court from reviewing nonconstitutional error in a capital case, a result that disregards section 19-2827 and is contrary to
precedent. See, e.g., Payne, 146 Idaho at 571-75 (considering for first time on appeal if I.e. §§
19-2522 and 18-215 prevent defendant's statements to state experts during mental health exams
from being admitted at sentencing).
The State's request for application of fundamental error review to capital sentencing
errors, rather than section 19-2827, is a request that death be treated the same as any other
punishment The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that death is different from
every other form of punishment, "not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability.
It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation . . . . And it is unique, finally, in its absolute
renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoted with approval in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 995-96 (1991 )). This Court has similarly acknowledged the unique nature of the death
penalty requires that it be treated differently from any other punishment. "Death is clearly a
different kind of punishment from any other that may be imposed, and . . . the gravity of a
sentence of death and the infrequency with which it is imposed outweighs any rationale that
might be proposed to justify refusal to consider errors not objected to below." State v. Osborn,
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102 Idaho 405,410-11 (1981). The State disregards this history and asks this Court to do the
same. Because the constitutional basis for treating death differently from other forms of
punishment cannot be disregarded without doing violence to the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, this Court must reject the State's request for this Court to treat death sentences the
same as any other sentence or punishment.
In addition, the State's request for this Court to apply fundamental error review to capital
sentencing errors disregards section 19-2827, rendering it superfluous. Section 19-2827, in
relevant part, provides as follows:
(a) Whenever the death penalty is imposed, and upon the judgment becoming
final in the trial court, the sentence shall be reviewed on the record by the
Supreme Court ofIdaho . ...
(b) The Supreme Court of Idaho shall consider the punishment as well as any
errors enumerated by way of appeal.
(c) With regard to the sentence the court shall determine:

(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and
(2) Whether the evidence supports the jury's or judge's finding of a statutory
aggravating circumstance from among those enumerated in section 19-2515,
Idaho Code.

(e) In addition to its authority regarding correction of errors, the court, with
regard to review of death sentences, shall be authorized to:
(1) Affirm the sentence of death; or
(2) Set the sentence aside and remand the case for resentencing by a jury or, if
waived, the trial judge.

(f) The sentence review shall be in addition to direct appeal,
review and appeal shall be consolidated for consideration.

I.e.

if taken, and the

§ 19-2827 (emphasis added). By its own terms, the statute automatically preserves

sentencing errors in capital cases for this Court's independent review without the need for
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objection. The mandatory nature of this Court's section 19-2827 duty to reVIew capital
sentencing errors is made clear by the fact that such review must be conducted by this Court,
irrespective of whether it is even sought by a capital defendant. See State v. Wells, 124 Idaho 836
(1993) (reviewing death sentence and sentencing even though defendant dismissed his appeal
and petition for post-conviction relief). Moreover, applying the fundamental error standard to
review capital sentencings would render section 19-2827 a nullity. Such a result is contrary to
well-established rules of statutory interpretation.
It is incumbent upon this Court to interpret a statute in a manner that will not
nullify it, and it is not to be presumed that the legislature performed an idle act of
enacting a superfluous statute. Walker v. Nationwide Fin. Corp. of Idaho, 102
Idaho 266, 629 P .2d 662 (1981). The Supreme Court will not construe a statute in
a way which makes mere surplusage of provisions included therein. Hartley v.
Miller-Stephan. I 07 Idaho 688, 692 P.2d 332 (1984).

Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 572 (1990). Thus, if this Court were to accept the State's
invitation and apply Perry, it could only do so by nullifying section 19-2827 and more than thirty
years of precedent.
Since 1981, when this Court first applied section 19-2827 in Osborn, the statute has been
amended twice: once in 1994 and again in 2006. When the legislature amends a statute, this
Court must assume it does so with full knowledge of this Court's existing applications of the
statute. State v. Parker, 141 Idaho 775, 779 (2005) ("We assume the legislature has full
knowledge of existing judicial decisions and our caselaw." (Citation omitted)); see also State v.

Maybee, 148 Idaho 520, 529 (2010) ("Statutes are construed under the assumption that the
legislature was aware of all other statutes and legal preceden[t] at the time the statute was
passed." (Quoting DrufJel v. State, Dep't of Transp., 136 Idaho 853, 856 (2002))); Smith v.

Washington County Idaho, 150 Idaho 388, 392 (2010) (recognizing the presumption that when
the legislature amends a statute, it does so knowing "of the prevailing judicial interpretation of
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that statute" and such amendments represent the legislature's intent and choice to change that
interpretation). The legislature's decision to amend section 19-2827 twice since Osborn, but
leave this Court's duty to review death sentences and capital sentencings unchanged,
demonstrates the legislature's intent that this Court continue reviewing death sentences and
capital sentencings as it always has. Moreover, when section 19-2827 was enacted in 1977, this
Court had been applying the fundamental error standard to review unobjected-to trial errors in
non-capital cases for six years. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. Had the legislature wanted the same
standard to apply to review of capital cases, section 19-2827 would have been unnecessary.
Finally, if this Court were to accept the State's invitation to apply fundamental error to
review death sentences and capital sentencing errors, it would need to disregard more than three
decades of precedent, in contravention of principles of stare decisis. "Stare decisis requires this
Court to follow controlling precedent unless it is manifestly wrong, proven to be unjust or
unwise, or overruling it is necessary in light of obvious principles of law and justice." Sopatyk v.
Lemhi County, 151 Idaho 809, 819 (2011). Even if section 19-2827 could be disregarded, the

State has failed to demonstrate how this Court's application of section 19-2827 over the past
three decades is manifestly wrong, has proven to be unjust or unwise, or that overruling
precedent is necessary in light of obvious principles of law and justice. As a result, where the
unobjected-errors before this Court stem from Mr. Dunlap's death sentence and capital
sentencing, not a guilt-phase trial, the errors must be addressed pursuant to section 19-2827, as
informed by more than three decades of precedent
D.

Section 19-2827 Preserves All Sentencing Errors For This Court's Mandatory,
Independent Review
As previously noted, section 19-2827 automatically preserves capital sentencing errors

for this Court's independent review without the need for objection. The various provisions of
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section 19-2827 dictate the scope of this Court's independent duty to review a death sentence on
the record, to consider the punishment in addition to errors identified on appeal, to determine

whether the sentence is a product of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary jactor, and to
determine whether the evidence supports the finding of an aggravating circumstance.

I.e. § 19-

2827,
The State myopically focuses on the portion of section 19-2827 which requires this Court
to determine whether a death sentence "was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice,
or any other arbitrary factor," providing little more than dictionary definitions of these terms to
support its claim that fundamental error review applies to unobjected-to capital sentencing errors.
(Supp. Br. of Resp., pp.l2-13.) The State then cites Georgia and Missouri cases as examples of
jurisdictions that only review unobjected-to capital sentencing errors for plain error, suggesting
Idaho do the same. Neither case supports the State's position.
Georgia'S "plain error" review requires its supreme court to review death sentences and
errors not objected to below "to determine '[w]hether the sentence of death was imposed under
the influence of passion, prejUdice, or any other arbitrary factor.' OCGA § 17-1 0-35(c)(1 )."
Collier v. State, 707 S.E.2d 102, 108 (Ga. 2011) (Nahmias, 1., specially concurring) (citations

omitted). In conducting this review, the Court considers whether there is a reasonable probability
any unobjected-to errors changed the jury's exercise of discretion in choosing between life and
death. Gissendaner v. State, 532 S.E.2d 677, 713 (Ga. 2000). In contrast, Idaho's fundamental
error review places the burden on a defendant to persuade an appellate court that an error
violated his unwaived constitutional rights, that the error plainly exists on the record and is not
harmless. Perry, 150 Idaho at 227-28. Thus, Georgia'S "plain error" review is more like this
Court's review under section 19-2827 than it is like Perry's fundamental error review. The State
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also relies on State v. Cole, 71 S. W.3d 163, 170 (Mo. 2002), to show the Missouri Supreme
Court reviews prosecutorial misconduct in capital cases only for manifest injustice under the
plain error rule. Cole involved the Court's consideration of a claim of prosecutorial misconduct
during guilt-phase closing argument, not sentencing. Id. Thus, Cole is inapposite.
Moreover, unlike Idaho, both Georgia and Missouri have narrowly defined the kinds of
murder that are death-eligible. Compare Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-1 (limiting death eligibility to
felony-murder and murder committed unlawfully, with malice aforethought) and Mo. Stat. Ann.
§ 565.020 (limiting death eligibility to first-degree murder defined as knowingly causing the

death of another person after deliberation) with

I.e.

§ 18-4004 (rendering broad category of all

first-degree murder death-eligible). Thus, Georgia and Missouri have limited the risk of the
arbitrary and capricious imposition of death upon an undeserving defendant by narrowly defining
the types of murder that are death-eligible and requiring an enumerated aggravating circumstance
be found beyond a reasonable doubt before death can be imposed, in addition to mandatory
review. Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-30; Mo. Stat. Ann. § 565.032.
In contrast, Idaho has broadly defined all first-degree murder as death-eligible, including
murder without provocation and without specific intent. Creech, 507 U.S. at 474. As a result,
Idaho's death penalty scheme already creates a high risk that death will be arbitrarily and
capriciously imposed upon one who is not deserving. Id. at 475 ("[A] sizable class of even those
murderers who kill with some provocation or without specific intent may receive the death
penalty under Idaho law."); I.C. §§ 18-4003, -4004. Where the finding of an enumerated
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt is the only trial level protection a capital
defendant in Idaho has against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of a death sentence, this
Court's independent review takes on special importance in ensuring death is not improperly
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executed against one who is constitutionally undeserving. Thus, even assuming Georgia and
Missouri engage in less exacting appellate review of death sentences and proceedings than
Idaho, both have adopted an additional layer of protection against the arbitrary and capricious
imposition and execution of the death penalty which is absent from Idaho's scheme.
The Idaho legislature has chosen to limit such constitutional protections to two
mechanisms: enumerated aggravating circumstances and broad appellate review under section
19-2827. Rather than risk a finding of unconstitutionality, the legislature opted to ensure all
capital sentencing errors, whether objected to or not, would be preserved for this Court's
meaningful, independent review. Such broad review is necessary to ensure death sentences are
not arbitrarily and capriciously imposed in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
E.

Mandatory, Independent Review Under Section 19-2827 Is Compatible With
Unified Review In Capital Cases
The State claims the independent review required under section 19-2827, which has co-

existed in harmony with section 19-2719's special appellate and capital post-conviction
procedures since 1984, is now suddenly incompatible with it. Specifically, the State appears to
claim that if this Court reviews death sentences and sentencing errors as required by section 192827, as it has done since 1981, then section 19-2719(6)'s provision requiring capital petitioners
to appeal any post-conviction order as part of the appeal taken from the conviction or sentence in
a unified appellate proceeding, is superfluous. (Supp. Br. of Resp., pp.l5-16.)
The State fails to grasp the difference between sentencing errors this Court must review
on the record pursuant to section 19-2827, and post-conviction claims which encompass both

guilt and penalty phase errors rarely obvious from the record. See, e.g., State v. Elison, 135
Idaho 546, 551-52 (2001) ("This Court typically does not address claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel on direct appeal because the record is often not fully developed on this issue."); I.C.
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§ 19-490 1(b) ("This remedy is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the

proceedings in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence or conviction. Any issue which
could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in
post-conviction proceedings .... "). Indeed, the plain language of section 19-2827 specifies "the

sentence shall be reviewed on the record by the Supreme Court of Idaho."

I.e.

§ 19-2827(a)

(emphasis added). While post-conviction claims may be premised on errors that seem obvious
from the record, such as counsel's failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct, it is rare that
such a claim can be resolved solely on the direct appeal record. Instead, whether counsel had a
reasonable strategic basis for failing to object to such misconduct would need to be explored in
post-conviction proceedings where additional fact-finding could explain counsel's motivation for
failing to object. Perry, 150 Idaho at 229.
Finally, the State argues section 19-2827 has resulted in federal courts reviewing Idaho
capital sentencing errors for the first time in federal habeas "without the benefit of this Court
having a fair opportunity review [sic] those claims." (Supp. Resp. Brief, p.16.) The opposite is
true. Section 19-2827' s requirement that this Court review all sentencing errors, whether raised
on appeal or objected to below, provides this Court with absolute authority to independently
review and consider all capital sentencing errors and issues first, before they reach federal court.

See Beam v. Paskett, 3 F.3d 1301, 1306-07 (9 th Cif. 1993) (addressing challenge to
constitutionality of aggravator that was briefed before state supreme court but not addressed,
concluding under section 19-2827 and Osborn, state court's affirmance of death sentence was an
"implicit rejection of claims of error that fall within its obligatory review even if the defendant
has not raised those claims with specificity"). Thus, section 19-2827 has not infringed on
principles of comity and federalism.
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CONCLUSION
Death is different from any other penalty. This difference has resulted in the legislature's
adoption of section 19-2827, which imposes a duty on this Court to review all death sentences
and proceedings for error, irrespective of whether objections are raised or an appeal is filed.
Mr. Dunlap's death sentence and sentencing proceeding are governed by the review established
in section 19-2827, as applied in Osborn and its progeny, and Perry simply does not apply.
DATED this 1i

h

day of August, 2012.
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